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INTRODUCTION 
Since Ja9:J, U.S. Navy Regulations 
have tasked naval officers with the 
responsihility of exercising their ilHlc· 
pendent judgment in the application of 
force to protect the lives and property 
of U.S. citizens on foreign soil against 
actual or impending arhitrary violence. 
These regulations were written at a time 
when international law recognized the 
principle of applied force to protect the 
lives and property of nationals in for-
eign states when the foreign state was 
unable or unwilling to protect them. 
The purpose of this paper is to 
examine these regulations in the light of 
the changes that have taken place in 
international law-in the 76 years since 
they were drafted-in order to estahlish 
whether they have any utility in today's 
world. Noting that the majority of 
instances in which the United States has 
u::'ed force for the protection of its 
citizens ahroad have taken place in 
Latin America and also that the re-
straints imposed hy international treaty 
are particularly meaningful in this ar('a, 
Latin America has heen ehmmll as the 
huckground locale. 
I-THE NAVAL OFFICER 
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The navlli admiral or (:ap-
tain ... in international law, as in 
strategy and tactics ... must 
know the doctrine of his country. 
In emergencies, not infrequently, 
he has had to act for his superior, 
without orders, in the spirit and 
manner his superior would de-
sire ... Injudicious action may 
precipitate hostilities; or injudi-
cious inaction may permit in-
fringement of American rights, of 
persons or of properLy.1 
Today, Lhe officers alHI men of all 
branches of the service are living and 
operating in all areas of the world in 
furtherance of our Nation's ohjectives. 
The responsibilities neccssarily at-
tending these operations create frequent 
direct relations with foreign govern-
ments, hoth allied and neutral. In these 
relations it is incumhcnt that our Na-
tion's representatives be guided by "the 
principles and rules of con-
duct .•. which states feel themselves 
bound to ohserve, and, "therefore, do 
commonly ohserve in their relations 
with each other."2 The Navy, because 
of the necessity of conducting opera-
tions heyond the continental limits of 
the United States, has always stressed 
the study of international law for its 
officers. To further the education of the 
naval officer in the field of international 
law, the Naval War College inaugurated 
the "Blue Book" program in 1894, 10 
years after thc founding of the Naval 
War Collegc itself, to disseminate per-
tinent educational and informational 
material in the field of international law 
to all naval officers.3 
U.S. Navy Regulations, which are in 
the nature of general orders to all 
members of the naval service, place 
particular emphasis on international 
law. Artiele 1214, U.S. Navy Regula-
tions, 1948, provides that "all persons 
in the naval scrviee, in their relations 
with foreign nations, and with the gov-
ernment or agcnts thereof, shall con-
form to international law and to the 
preccdents established by the United 
States in such relations," while artiele 
0505 makes it mandatory for a com-
manding officer to ohserve and require 
his command to observe the "principles 
of international law." Among the prin-
ciples of international law are those 
found in articles 0613 and 0614 con-
cerning the protection of the lives and 
properly of U.S. citizens on foreign 
territory. 
Thl'$l' urticll's pro\,id.,: 
Article 0613. Violations of Inter-
national Law and Treaties. 
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On occasions where injury to 
thc Unitcd Statcs or to citizcns 
thereof is eOlllllliLLNI or threat-
ened, in violation of the principiI'S 
of internationul law or treuty 
rights, the scnior officer prcscnt 
shall consult with the diplomatic 
or consular representatives of the 
United States, if possible, and 
shall take such action as the 
gravity of the situation demands. 
The rcsponsibility for any action 
tuken by u navul force, howevcr, 
rests wholly upon the senior offi-
cer present. lIe shall immediately 
report all the facts to the Secre-
tary of the Navy. 
Article 0614. Use of Foree 
Against a Friendly State. 
1. The use of force by United 
States naval personnel against a 
friendly foreign state, or against 
anyone within the territories 
thereof, is illegal. 
2. The right of self-preserva-
tion, however, is a right which 
bl'longs to states as well as to 
individuals, and in the case of 
statcs it includes the protection of 
the state, its honor, and its posses-
sions, and the lives and property 
of its citizens against arhitrnry 
violence, actual or impending, 
whereby the state or its citizens 
may suffer irreparable injury. The 
conditions calling for the applica-
tion of the right of self-preserva-
tion cannot be defined before-
hand, but must be left to the 
sound judgment of responsible 
officers, who arc to perform their 
duties in this respect with all 
possible care and forebearance. In 
no case shall force be exercised in 
time of pcace otherwise than as an 
applil'ut ion of t he right of sl'l f-
pn's,'n'nt ion as IIhoVl' tI,'finl,d, It 
IIlUst be uscil only liS it lust resort, 
and then only to tlw extent which 
is ubsolutdy nccessary to accolll-
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pi ish the end required. 1L can 
never he exercised with a view to 
innicting punishment for the aels 
already committed. 
3. Whenever, in the application 
of the above-mentioned prin-
ciples, it shall become necessary 
to land an armed force in a 
foreign territory on occasions of 
political disturbance where the 
local authorities are unable to give 
adequate protection of life and 
property, the assent of such au-
thorities, or of some of them, 
shall first be obtained, if it can be 
done without prejudice to the 
interests involved. 
It is interesting to note that these 
articles have remained virtually un-
changed since 1893 when they were 
first drafteJ and incorporated in the 
Regulations for the Government of the 
Navy of the United States as paragraphs 
285,286, and 287, section 4, chapter V, 
and when principles of international law 
pl'rmilll'd a slatl' to use force for the 
protection of its citizl'ns and their 
property in a foreign state.4 From a 
mere perusal of these articles it seems 
that the enforcement of duties under 
international law is left largely to the 
discretion of the commanding officer. 
I n fact, prior to 1928 this was largely 
so. In recounting 76 instances where 
armed forces of the United States op-
erated on forei~ soil or engnged in 
actual hostilities with another nation on 
her soil under the guise of protecting 
U.S. citizens or their property abroad, 
Milton Offutt states: 
What has generally hap-
pened ... is that naval officers 
commanding ships or squadrons 
on foreign stations have taken 
such action as they bclieved neces-
sary for the protection of Amcri-
can livl's and property, and have 
reported their action to thc Sl'cre-
tary of. the Navy after thcir 
government hm; hecn committed 
to their proccdurcs.s 
Thl'se cases covered a timespan from 
IB13 to 1926, and on only one occasion 
did the Government refuse to approve 
the decision of a commanding officer of 
sending a landing party ashore.6 
There have hcen many changes since 
the drafting of these regulations, both in 
our foreign policy and in the accepted 
principles of international law, yet the 
regulations still remain. Some of the 
language as well as the concepts appear 
dated. For instance, the regulations ad-
dress themselves to the 19th century 
concept of "self-preservation," generally 
conceded as broadcning the principle of 
"self-defense" to the point where it was 
quite inadmissible. Waldock quotes Hall 
as saying "in the last resort almost the 
whole of the duties of states arc sub-
ordinated to the right of self-preserva-
tion,"7 while himself maintaining that 
"such a doctrine would destroy the 
imperative character of lilly system of 
law in which it Wl.IS applil'll. for it makes 
all ohligation to olH'Y thl' law nll'rt'ly 
conditional; and there is hardly 1111 act 
of international lawlessness which it 
might not bc claimed to exeuse.,,8 
Of far greater significance is the 
prohihition of Llw usc of force aga;nst 
tIl(: poliLical independence and Lerri-
torial integrity of states set forth in the 
United Nations Charter and also em-
hodied in the charters of regional or-
ganizations and security alliances. As 
most insLances involving the use of force 
to protect lives and property of our 
nationals abroad occurred in Latin 
America, an understanding of the im-
pact made hy Latin American regional-
ism with its strong attitudes of noninter-
vention, state sovereignty, self-deter-
mination, and exclusive competence on 
this traditional right of international law 
is crucial whcn evaluating the utility of 
Llwse provisions of U.S. Navy Regula-
tions which imposed upon the naval 
officer the duLy to exercise his in de-
11I'IICIt'nt judgment when the lives or 
pmpl'rty of U.S. naLionals are in jeop-
Irtly. 
II-TilE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM: 
AN OVERVIEW 
Historical Experience. The present 
Clmrll'r of the Organization of Ameri-
rnn Statl~s, daLed 2 May 1948, must be 
I!lokl'd at in the perspeeLive of hisLory. 
It~ I'volution has been described as a 
"tr;lII~ition from an unwritten to a 
"rilll'n eonsLitution. ,,1 As early as 
lIl:!h. Simon Bolivar recognized the 
"I'uklll'ss of American Republics and 
(,1I11t·" for a general American congress 
tl) cllnvene in Panama for the purpose 
I)f ~igning treaties of alliance. AILhough 
IItlt'nded by only four countries, Colom-
hill. !'I'ru, Cenlrlll America, and Mexi-
('1),2 the Cong~css of Panama may he 
l'ilid to Imve laid the cornerstone for 
(utllrl' hemispheric solidarity and under-
fltanding. The charLer's origins may also 
hi' traced Lo the Monroe Doctrine, 
I'nUlII'iaLed in a PresidenLial message of 
2 Ih'cemhl'r lB2:~, which proclaimed 
IlIlninll'rvcnLion of Europe in the gov-
I'rnnll'nts of the WesLern Hemispherc. 
Bllth the Monroc Doctrine and thc 
Panullla Treaty were dircctl'd primarily 
t!lward tlw prohlt·m of defending the 
!'lIvl'reignty of sLaLcs in the WesLern 
1I1'lIIispherc, but unlike the Monroe 
Dllc·trine, which was a unilaLeral procla-
mation by the United StaLes, the 
Panama TreaLy envisioned binding all 
1IIl'lIIhl'r states to muLual defense. 
'I'lli'm werc a seril's of intcr-Amcrican 
confercnces betwcen IB26 and 18B9, 
having as their principal object common 
defl'm~e and muLual protection of par-
ticipating states, but thcre was no true 
hemispheric representation until 1889 
when the United States took its first 
positive step toward crl'ating a hl'lIIi-
!'Jlhcrie oq!anii:ation by calling for thl' 
Fin~t International Confercnee of 
Amrrican States to nwet in Washington, 
D.C. There, in 1890, wiLh all the 
19 
eounLries of the Western Hemisphere 
represenLed, except the Dominican Re-
public, were laid the bases for the Pan 
American movement by the creation of 
a permanent inter-American organiza-
tion, the Commercial Bureau of the 
American Republics, later designated 
the Pan American Union. 
History indicates that the United 
States was motivated more by a desire 
Lo esLahlish economic relations than a 
desire to insure the maintenance of 
political and social stability within the 
framework of the Pan American Union. 
The rcason why is evident. The UniLcd 
SLates, by this time ~ world power, saw 
little need for mutual defense arrange-
ments with her neighbors to thc south 
who were characterized by political 
instahility and economic backwardness. 
In the years following the foundation of 
what Latin American governments must 
have hoped was a true international 
organization, as envisioned by Simon 
Bolivar in 1826, the United States 
assumed not only the role of protector 
of the Western Hemisphere, but also 
that of mcntor. Under the Roosevl'lt 
I:orollary to thc Monroc Doctrine, LI\(, 
United States asscrted the right to inLcr-
vene in Latin American countries in 
order to pTl'vent the intervention of 
European powers in CirClIJIlslilllees of 
political or economic chaos. European 
intervention at this time was quite 
common and deemed justified to collect 
overdue dehts. Such intervention might 
have given European powers a pretext 
for reesLablishing hases in the Western 
Ilt'misphere imd thereby weaken na-
tional seeuriLy. If LaLin American coun-
tries did not exercise their sovereign 
powers responsibly enough to avoid 
giving European powers a just cause for 
intervention, the United States, to pro-
tect itself from harm, stepped in. Using 
thit~ rationil!t·, the United Stall's inter-
wned in the Dominican Hl'llUhlie, lIaiti, 
and Nicaragua and used its power to 
gain strategic objectives in Cuba, Puerto 
Rico, and Panama. Instead of ushering 
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in an era of understanding and interna-
tional cooperation, the creation of the 
Pan American Union was a prelude to 
an era of frank and deliberate military 
intervention in Latin America under the 
pretext of upholding the Monroe Doc-
trine. The Department of State Bulletin 
lists 35 examples of U.S. intervention in 
the affairs of Latin America from 1812 
to 1926.3 
Fight for a Concept. It is small 
,yonder then that the development of 
the inter-American system durin/!: the 
years 1890-1933 was characterized by 
Latin American efforts to secure prin-
ciples of nonintervention that would 
govrrn relations among member states 
of the Pan American Union or that 
these principles loom so large in the 
present Charter of the Organization of 
American Shlll.es. On the other hand, the 
U.S. position on intervention was not 
without merit and had a strong hasis in 
then existing international law. The 
United States was particularly con-
cernt'd with protecting its nationals and 
their property from violence in Latin 
American countries when the local au-
thorities were unable or unwilling to 
protect them. The views of the U.S. 
Government on this right of interven-
tion wcre very clearly expressed Ily 
Charles Evans Hughes, American ddc-
gate at the Havana Conference in 1928, 
in resisting the principle advocated by 
the Latin American countries that no 
state had the right to intervenc in the 
internal or external affairs of another. 
What are we to do when govern-
ments break down and American 
citizens are in danger of their 
lives? ..• I am not speaking of 
sporadic acts of violencc, or of the 
rising of mobs, or or' those dis-
t£l'ssing incidents, which may 
occur in <Iny eountry howl'vl'r 
wdl mlll1ini~tcred. I mn slll'akin~ 
of the occasions where I sie 1 gov-
rrnment itself is unable to 
function for a time because of 
difficulties which confront it and 
which it is impossible for it to 
surmount. 
Now it is a principal [sic] of 
international law that in such a 
case a government is fully justified 
in taking action-I would call it 
interposition of a temporary 
character-for the purpose of 
protecting the lives and property 
of its nationals. I could say that 
that is not intervention .•. Of 
course the United States cannot 
forego its right to protect its 
citizens.4 
However, hy 1928 it also had be-
come clear to the United States that any 
mraningful regional association in the 
Western Ilemisphere would depend on a 
shift from its position of unilateral 
intervention, and that year saw the 
abandonment of the Roosevelt corollary 
to the i\'lonroe Doctrine in the Clark 
Memorandum. Thereafter, military in-
terventions in Haiti and Nicaraguas 
were liquidated; the Platt amendment 
under which the United States was given 
the right to intervene in Cuba was 
abrogated in 1934, and a new treaty was 
negotiated with Panama concerning the 
Panama Canal in 1I):l(i. In 19:1:1 the 
United Statcs, at the Seventh Inter-
~merican Conference, accepted in prin-
CIple the doctrine of nonintervention 
and then embraced it totally in 1936 at 
the Buenos Aires Conference for the 
l\laintenance of Peace. By signing an 
Additional Protocol relative to noninter-
vcntion,6 the United Stales was gener-
ally regarded as unequivocally renounc-
ing the principle of intervention for the 
protection of the lives and property oC 
nationals.7 
I f any doubt remained recrarding the 
. f t' 
VII'W 0 the lInill'd Stall's, it wns "i~-
pl'llrli ill 19:iB whrll Secretary of State 
I >ull('s, atltl£l's~illg himself to the civil 
slrife in Lebanon, said: 
Now what we would do if Ameri-
can life and property was I [;ic 1 
endangered would depend, of 
course, in the first insLanee upon 
what we were requcsLcd Lo do by 
the Government of Lebanon. We 
do not introduce American forccs 
into for('ign counLrics cxcept on 
the invitaLion of the lawful gov-
ernment of the SLate coneerned.s 
This change of policy on the part of 
the United SLaLes was occasioncd not 
only by a realizaLion that its past policy 
of unilateralism and inLervcntion had 
failed Lo esLahlish sLrong viable govcrn-
menLs and had cvoked deep resentment, 
but also by a realization that hemi-
spheric solidarity of Cered the bcst se-
curity against the subversive acLivities of 
the European powcrs with their large 
communities 111 Latin Amcrica.9 This 
hemispheric solidariLy manifested iLsclf 
in an inLer-Amrrican security sysLem 
with two focal poinLs: consulLation if 
peace were LhreaLened (Buenos Aires, 
19:1(i) and colle cLive acLion to repel or 
prevent 11ggre~sion (I1avana, 1940). 
The New Illslnnnenls. TIII~ change-
over from a policy oC unilateral inter-
ven tion to one of collective respon-
sihility for hemisphcrie solidarity is 
emllodied in the two documents Lhat 
arc the founclaLions of the Organization 
of American SLaLcs: the Inter-American 
Treaty of He('iprocal Assistance of 1947 
(called the Rio Treaty) and the Charter 
of the Organization of American States 
signed in 1948. AILhough boLh of the~e 
documenLs postdated the United Na-
Lions CharIer, the basic principles con-
laincd in them were firmly fixed at the 
time of the signing of the Charter in San 
Francisco in 1945. The Latin American 
~Iall'~, IUl\'ing won from Ihl' L1nilt'd 
:-'Iah'~ rt'l'ognilion of Ihl' l'rint'iplt' Ill' 
nllninll'f\'I'nlilln, \I I'n' :lllxioll~ 10 1'1"1" 
wnl any illlJlllll'lll'Y 10 1111'ir n'gional 
organizaLion, parLielllarly in IIIl' an'a of 
intrrvenLion by non-American powers in 
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the mainLenance of pcace and s,!<!urity 
among A merican StaLes. Largely as a 
result of Lheir in[;istem:e in mainLaining 
the integrity of Lheir regional sl!eurity 
sysLem, provisions were ineorporaLed in 
the UniLed Nations Charter assuring the 
continued viability of regional organiza-
Lions in areas relaLing to the main-
Lenanee oC international peace and 
security. 
The CharLer oC the Organization of 
American SLates, signed in 19411, is "an 
amazing composit L sic] of rules, agree-
ments, principles, and aspiraLions,,,l 0 
none of which arc new huL merely the 
eodiCieation, coneenLration, and recon-
struction of what had transpired in the 
inter-American system since 1826.11 
That noninLervenLion continued to be 
Lhe fundamenLal principle of intcr-
American solidarity is clear from the 
language of the charter. According to 
article 15: 
No SLaLe or group of States has 
the right to intervene, directly or 
indirectly, for any reason what-
ever, in the inLcrnal or extcrnal 
affairs of any oLher SLaLe. The 
fon'going principle prohibiLs not 
only armed force but also any 
oLher form of interference or at-
LempLed thrcaL against thc per-
sonality of the SLatc or againsL iLs 
political, economic and cultural 
elements. 
Aud article 17: 
The terri Lory of a State is in-
violable; it may not be the ohjeet, 
evl'u Lemporarily, of miliLary 
occupation or of other measures 
of force taken by another StaLe, 
direcLly or indircctly, on any 
woulJ(lg whaLever. No Lerritorial 
al'quisil ions or ~Jl",'ial aclvanlal!"s 
ohlaiJll'c1 I'illll'r h\' 1'01"1'1' or h\' 
0111" .. llll':ln~ or 1";I'I"l'iun shall \;" 
rl'('ognizl'd. 
TIll' prineiplc of noninLervention is 
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extended further by article 16, which 
affirms: 
No State may use or encourage 
the use of coercive measures of an 
economic or political character in 
order to force the sovereign will 
of another State and obtain from 
it advantages of any kind. 
Thus extended in articles 15 through 
17, the principle of nonintervention had 
to be reconciled with that of collective 
seeurity, already recognized in the Rio 
Treaty and the United Nations Charter. 
Article 19 of the charter thus provides: 
fvleasures adopted for the main· 
tenance of peace and security in 
accordance with existing treaties 
do not constitute a violation of 
the pri~ciples set forth in Articles 




Intervention is a word whieh is 
often used quite generally to 
denote almost any act of inter· 
ference hy one state in the affairs 
of another; hut in a more special 
sense it means dictatorial inter· 
ference in the domestic or foreign 
affairs of another state which im-
pairs that state's independence.! 
While all nations agree on the hroad 
principle that intervention is unlawful, 
there is less agreement on just what is 
encompassed by the term "interven-
tion." The traditional doctrine of re-
lating intervention to the use of or 
threat to use force does not conform to 
the language of article 15 of the charter, 
hut if intervention is carried to the 
ultimale and impractical ('xln'me in-
:::isled upon hy Ihe draflers or I I\(' 
charter Lo covcr all acLs thaL lIlay he 
vicwcd as prcssure, it becomes nehulous. 
Some act. of evcry naLion may scnd its 
reverberations everywhere. The United 
States, by the exercise of its economic 
and political policies, whether they be 
foreign or domestic, exercised through 
action or inaction, may intervene in 
Latin American affairs as effectively as 
did the sending of Marines in earlier 
times. It has often been said, in more 
than jest, that if the economy of the 
United States sneezes, the countries of 
Latin America catch pneumonia. Will 
not, then, the participation of the 
United States in the Alliance for Prog-
ress inevitabl~ lead to an accusation of 
intervention'! By its very prcsence, the 
United States affects the internal affairs 
of its neighbors to the south. Thus, by 
painting with such a broad brush, the 
drafters of the charter may have de· 
feated the very purpose of the prohibi-
tion. If one becomes enamored by the 
all-encompassing euphonic concept of 
nonintervention advocated by these 
Latin American jurists, one is left with a 
concept that is hound to fail as incom-
patihle with the realities of international 
politics. 
It is hard to condellln prohihitions 
on intervention for they arc certainly 
part of a quest for an ideal seen as the 
('qual sovereignty and inuep(muenee of 
all nalions. However, a more reali~tie 
approaeh than that ndql't('llllt \lo~()ta iH 
expressed by the Unit('d Kingdom in the 
report of the Special Committee on 
Principles of International Laws Con-
cerning Friendly Rclations and Co-
operation Among States: 
... it would be recognized that in 
an interdependent world, it is 
inevitable and dcsirable that statcs 
will be concerned with lmd seek 
to influence the actions and 
policies of other states, and the 
objective of international law is 
not to prI'v('nt sueh aClivity. hut 
ra tlll'r to il\sun~ that it is 
eompatiblc with the sovereigu 
eq uaIity of states and self-
determination of their peoples.3 
Nice sounding words, but what of the 
objcctivity of international law if the 
onus is to be placed there? If there is 
lack of agreement on lawful interven-
tion when economic issues are involved, 
the problem becomes indeed chaotic 
when examining areas where political 
issues are paramount. The interventions 
in Greece, Lebanon, Algeria, the Congo, 
the Suez Canal, and Vietnam are ex-
amples of cases where conflicting politi-
cal interests of partics concerned pro-
duced not only conflicting statements 
of facts, hut also incompatible legal 
analyscs.4 In our own hemisphere we 
can find examples in Guatemala (1954) 
and the Dominican Republic (1965). 
Guatemala. The Guatemalan crisis of 
1954 is cited as confirming the greater 
fear Latin Ameficans have of U.S. inter-
vention than 0 intervention from out-
side the Western Hemisphere.s In l\larch 
1951, Col. Jacobo Arbenz Guzman 
assumed the Presidency of Guatemala. 
His government quickly took on a de-
cided Communist 0\'t'rtone_6 The 
American-owned United Fruit Company 
was informed in Fehruary ] 95:1 that 
234,000 of its :~OO,OO() acres on the 
Pacific coast would be expropriated 
under agrarian reform legislation en-
acted in 1953. Compensation offered hy 
the Guatemalan Government amounted 
to 8600,000 in bonds, although the 
United Fruit Company estimated its 
value at 84,000,000_ Later that same 
year, the Guatemalan Government ex-
propriated the 174,000 acres owned hy 
United Fruit on the Caribbean coast. 
The expropriated land was distributed 
to landless peasants.7 
On 17 May 1954, the U.S. State 
Department announced that a shipment 
of arms had been landed in Guatemala 
after having been shipped from Commu-
nist Poland. This eau~d the 1I11ilt'd 
States to ship arms supplies to Ilonduras 
and Nicaragua pursuant to military assis-
tance pacts concluded on 20 May and 
23 April. Shortly thereafter, on 18 June 
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Guatemalan insurgent forces under the 
command of Col. Carlos Castillo Armas 
(a Guatemalan Army officer who had 
been in political exile since 1951) 
crossed the frontier from Honduras and 
advanced into Guatemala at several 
points.8 President Arbenz Guzman 
charged Honduras and Nicaragua with 
open aggression in conjunction with the 
United States and called for an im-
mediate meeting of the United Nations 
Security Council.9 
Article 20 of the Charter of the 
Organization of A meriean States pro-
vides that "all international disputes 
that may arise between American States 
shall be submitted to the peaceful pro-
cedures sct forth in this Charter, before 
being referred to the Security Council 
of the United Nations." In the same 
vein, article 2 of the Rio Treaty obli-
gates the parties "to submit every con-
troversy that may arise hetween them to 
methods of peaceful settlement and to 
endeavor to settle any such controversy 
among themsclves by means of pro-
cedures in force in the Inter-American 
System before referring it to the Gen-
eral Assembly or the Security Council 
of the llnited NaLions." When the 
Guatemalan charge came to the Security 
Council, the United States and the two 
Latin American memhers of the Se-
curity Council maintained that the com-
plaint should be referred to the Organi-
zation of American States. By refusing 
to take substantive action on Guate-
mala's appeals, the Security Council 
"implicitly adopted the view that a 
member of the Organization of Ameri-
can States should, in fulfillment of its 
regional obligations and in the spirit of 
the United Nations Charter, seek to 
have the case resolved in the regional 
organization before bringing it to the 
Security Council.,,1 0 
While the Security r.oundl main-
tained a hands-o fC policy, the In tcr-
American Peace Commission (an agency 
of the Organization of American States) 
appointed a factfinding committee to 
24 
visit GuaLemala, Honduras, and Nica-
ragua. llowcver, on 27 June 1954, 
Pf(!sident Arbenz Guzman had resigned, 
and afLer negotiations wiLh his succes· 
sors a five-man junLa was sel up Lo rule 
Guatemala wiLh Colonel Armas as Presi-
dent. The new Guatemalan Government 
was officially recognized hy the United 
SLates on 1 a July 11)54. Subsequently, 
at the request of the new adminisLra-
tion, the entire maLLer was withdrawn 
from the Organization of Americlln 
StaLes and the Security CounciL I 1 On 
2() j)1'ccmlwr 1954, an agreenll'nL was 
rt'aehed lwtween the new government 
and the United Fruit Company by 
which all the lands expropriated under 
the land reform legislation were re-
sLored.12 
The Dominican Republic. On 28 
April 1%5, U.S. Marines landed in the 
Dominican Repuhlic for the express 
purpose of proLecLing lind evaeullting 
U.S. ciLizens and other foreign nationals 
and to proLect the U.S. Embassy in 
Sunto Domingo. This action was 
occa~ioned lIy assl!rtions Lhat A mcril"an 
liVl's were in dan~er and Lhal local 
authorilies were no longl'r able to p:uar-
anLee the safety of U.S. citizensl3 
following a virLual civil war uprising 
piLLing the lefList supporters of ex-Presi-
dent .I uan Bosch and rightwing elemenLs 
'Ied by Brig. Gen. Elias Wessin y Wessin. 
In i tially, only ,1.05 l\larines were 
landed. f 4 By :30 A prj), about 2,:>00 of 
the estimaLed 3,000 U.S. nationals in 
the Dominican Repuhlic had been 
evacuaLed together with other foreign 
nationals,15 yet on J May, the United 
SLlltes increased its troop sLrcngth to 
6,200.16 0 n 2 May, PresidenL J ohJ1son 
announced that he had commiLLed a 
LoLal of 14,000 troops Lo the Dominican 
Hqlllhlic and sLaLed Lheir lllis~i(}11 as 
proh'ctin:;! lives and pn'VI'II l ill:;! "allollH'r 
CUIllIIIUllil'l Slall' ill lhis 1I1'1I1il'phl'n':' 
Thl' I'rl'l'itll'lIt alll':;!I'11 that \I hal had 
hegun :115 a popular demo era lie rl'volu-
tion had hcen taken over hy a band of 
Communist conspiraLors.1 7 
The UniLed States had made an 
immediaLe appl~al Lo the Orgunization of 
American SLaLes for assisLance in carry-
ing ouL her sdf-appoinlt'd Lask. l\111ny 
Latin A nll'riClln COUll tries were highly 
criLieal of the U.S. military inLervenLion, 
contending that it eonLravened article 
17 of the CharLer of the Organization of 
Ameriean SLates, which holds the terri-
tory of a sLate inviolable and staLes that 
it may not he the ohjeeL of even 
tempomry military oeeupaLion for :Itly 
rem,on whalso,~ver.1 8 TIll' United Stlllm; 
prl'l,sed for the formation of an inltlr-
American peace force to lIlulLilaLl'ralize 
Lhe intervenLion at the TenLh Meeting of 
ConsulLation convened on 1 May. 
Opponents worried thaL a dangerous 
precedent would be established in the 
sanctioning of "eolleeLive intervention" 
but undoubtedly hoped that the estab-
lishmenL of the peace force would bring 
Lhe intervention Lo an end lind salvage 
the prestige of the inter-American sys-
tem. Supporters, on the oLher hand, 
were probably anxious Lo cover up the 
U.S. intervenLion with col\eeLive mea-
sures.19 An inler-Ameriean pl'aee force 
was formed on () May Lo 0pI'rall' under 
the authority of the TenLh l\leeting, buL 
the partieipaLion hy LaLin American 
connLries was symholie only.20 
Aftermath. The implieaLions of the 
GuaLemalan incident in 1951J, were seri-
ous for LaLin America. NoL only was the 
precedent estahlished that a member of 
Lhe Organization of American States 
would have Lo seck resolution of its case 
in the regional organizaLion before 
hringing it before the Security Council, 
huL also the vast imbalance of power in 
Lhe Western lIemisphere indicated thaL 
very little could be accomplished within 
lhe regional organization on hehalf of a 
lllt'm\wr state OppOSi1l1! tlH' lInitl'c1 
~lall'~ or il~ illll·I'I'l'I~. Thl'rl' \\'1111 Ii lilt' 
dOlllil ill tIll' minds of mallY !'ulill 
Anll'ricans lhaL the lJnilt'd States, in 
eollahoration wiLh lIonduras and 
Nielln1gua (LWO of the smaller and leasL 
signifiellnL LaLin American staLes), had 
direeLly intervened in the affairs of 
Guatemala. Miguel Y digoras Fuentes, 
who assumed the Presidency of GuaLe-
mala in ] 958, has indieal<:d that the 
overLhrow of the Arbenz Guzman gov-
ermmmt was masterminded by the U.S. 
Ambassador to Guatemala, John E. 
Peurifoy, and implied further that 
Colonel Armas was in the employ of the 
UniLed Fruit Company.21 
I f "the case of Guatemala had some-
what stained the shining armor of the 
OAS,,,22 U.S. intervention in the 
Dominican Repuhlic did far more, seem-
ingly treating thc Organization as a 
rubber stamp. The United States main-
tained that if time had permiLled the 
entire matter would have been initially 
referred to the Organization of Ameri-
can States23 alld thaL its own unilaL'~ral 
action was only a necessary prelude to 
multilaLeral eollecLive action and parLiei-
pation by the OrganizaLion of American 
States.24 There is no doubt that, given 
the intense pathological fear of interven-
tion prevalenL in Latin America, a mulli-
la tl~ral, inter-American inLt'rvention 
woul,1 he far h~ss repugnanL to world 
opinion and aceeptahle to the state 
intervened Lhan would unilateral action 
hy the United States. While as Wright 
ohserves, "intervention docs not guin in 
legaliLy under customary international 
law hy heing collective rather than 
• d' . I 1,,25 . J 1 I '11' I III lVI' ua , as pomteu ouL Iy ,I IC I, 
"in humanitarian siLuations, the faeL 
thaL more than one sLate has partici-
pated in the decision to intervene les-
sens the chance that the intervention 
wiII he used for reasons of sclf-
interest.,,26 
I t must he pointed out, howcver, 
that the intervenLion in the Dominican 
Repuhlic helped to produce stahility, 
allowing a free e1cction in which all 
candidates hud un equally fair chanel' to 
win. NI'ither of the two major eaIHIi-
dates demanded wiLhdrawal of forces, 
and while neither was overly enLhusi-
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asLic ahouL the presence of foreign 
forces on Dominican soil, neither re-
aCLed "with the typical outrage of na-
tion-state leaders to the presence" of 
the troops? 7 
IV-INTERVENTION: 
WHEN AND HOW 
As intervention was recognized to be 
contrary to intcrnational law, attempts 
were made to justify acts of interven-
tion as legitimate cases of protection of 
nationals abroud or of self-defense. In 
this regard, "intervention was not So 
much a righL as a sanction against a 
wrong or threatened wrong."1 
Protection of Lives and Property. A 
state's usc of force to protect the lives 
and property of its nationals ahroad was 
universally accepted as lawful by the 
jurists of the 19Lh and early 20th 
eenturies.2 The justificution for this 
concept was founded on the principle 
that international law's protection of 
sovereignty had a corollary duty im-
posed on a state to accord protection to 
foreign nationals. If intcrnational law 
prohihiled foreign intl'n'cntion of a 
forel,Cul or cocreive ehuraeLt'r, it is 
hl'eaut'(' it imposed a corresponding 
duty on the state not to crcate or 
tolerate conditions that justified such 
. I . 3 '1'1 III crvenlIons: IUH, every fltah~ musL 
afCord protection to aliens on her soil in 
eonformity with civilized minimum 
standards, and because individuals were 
viewed in intcrnational law as objects 
and thercfore an extension of their 
domiciliary state, any injury done an 
alien was an injury to his home state 
who then had a legal right to seek 
redress.4 As private property and 
human freedom were interrelated, it 
followed that there was an equal inter-
national law prineiple affording a home 
state the right to protect the private 
property of her nalionals in a forci~1I 
stale. S Today's utility of this I'riJl('il'lc 
has heen drastically changed, particu-
larly in Latin America. 
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Such authorities on Latin Amcrica 
and the Organization of American 
States as the husband and wife team of 
A.J. Thomas and Ann Van Wynen 
Thomas note that: 
In view of the prohibition of the 
use or threat of force against lhe 
territorial integrity of a state set 
forth in the United Nations Char-
ter, the strong language pro-
hibiting intervention in the Char-
ter of the Organization of Ameri-
can States, and the prohibition 
against military occupation of a 
state or the use of other measures 
of force against a state, also in the 
Charter of the Organization of 
Ameriean Stales, it can be said 
that armed intervention by a stale 
on behalf of its nationals who 
have suffered injury and a denial 
of justide at the hands of another 
government in order to enforce 
reparation, to punish and prevent 
future repetition, i.e., to impose 
sanctions in the form of reprisals, 
has been made illegal. 6 
The Thomascs maintain that the legality 
of protection of nationals hy means of 
intervention must therefore rest on 
some "primary right which is t'xc\lIlicd 
from the non-intervention han. "7 Su("11 
a primary right is the right of self-
clt'fense reserved in the United Nations 
Charter, article !)l; the Chartt'r of the 
Organization of American States, ar-
ticles 18 and 19; and the Rio Treaty, 
article 3. This right, a strictly limited 
one, must he determined hy reference 
to customary internationallaw.8 
Self-Defense. The best statement of 
the conditions for the exercise of this 
right of self-defense is found in the 
principles laid down by Secretary of 
State Daniel Wehster in the CarolilJ(' 
inddent of 1ll:~7. There must hI', he 
said, "a necessitv of self-dcfens(', in-
stant, overwhelming, leaving- no choice 
of means and no moment for ddibl'ra-
tion" and further, the action taken must 
involve "nothing unreasonable or exces-
sive, since the act justified by the 
necessity of self-defense must be limited 
by that necessity and kept clearly 
within it."9 The conditions under which 
a state may be entitled, as an aspect of 
self-defense, to intervene in another 
state, in order to protect its nationals 
from injury, were formulated by Profes-
sor Waldock in 1952 as follows: "There 
must be (1) an imminent threat of 
injury to nationals, (2) a failure or 
inability on the part of the territorial 
sovereignty to protect them, and (3) 
measures of protection strictly confined 
to the subject of protecting them 
against injury.,,1 0 
Using these guidelines, the original 
limited intervention in the disorders of 
the Dominican Republic on 28 April 
1965 to protect U.S. citizens from 
imminent danger in a situation of 
anarchy did not violate standards of 
customary international law. The 
United States chose, however, not to 
rest its case on the principle of self-
dl'fenSt~. Indl'l'd, hoth thl' Unilt'd Stalt's 
and later the Organi~ation of Anwriean 
States carefully avoided the ·use of the 
term "self-defense," relying instead on 
maintaining that its actions were sanc-
tionl'd by tIlt' r('eogni~(~(1 prin('iplt~ of 
humanitarian intervention. 11 The rt'a-
son why is clear. Any careful reading of 
article!) I of the United Nations Charter 
indicates that both individual states alHI 
regiomll organizations must report to 
and take orders from the United Na-
tions for action taken under the guise of 
the "inherent right" of self-defense. 
Humanitarian Intervention. Tradi· 
tional international law recognized the 
principle of humanitarian intervention 
when a state abused its right of sover-
(·ignty by pcrmilling within its It'rrilory 
tlw treatmcnt of its own nationals or 
foreigners in a manner violalivc of all 
univcrsal standards of humanity. 1 2 
Some maintain that the strict principles 
of modern multilateral treaty law may 
have completely abolished this right, 
particularly the absolute ban on inter-
vention of the Charter of the Organiza-
tion of American States,13 while others 
have continued to assert the legality of 
humanitarian intervention. Of these 
latter, the most eminent is Sir Hersch 
Lauterpacht, who finds intervention to 
be legally permissible "when a State 
renders itself guilty of cruelties against 
and persecution of its nationals in such 
a way as to deny their fundamental 
human right and to shock the con-
science of mankind,,,1 4 the rationale 
being that a decent respect for human 
rights and human dignity transcends the 
doctrine of absolute soverrignty insu-
lating a state from interference by the 
international community. 1 5 An even 
more meaningful justification is that of 
necessity, for there is no remedy except 
that of prevention. 
Some Conclusions on Intervention. 
[t is not inevitable that men 
should ask whether it is morally 
right to int!'rvene in the internal 
affairs of other nations. To some, 
it has obviously become a me~e 
question of posture-how to kerp 
a straight face while intervening, 
how to smile piously when dis-
covered, and how to win converts 
during the montl upsurge that 
should accompany the exposure 
of others in the great game of 
intervention.16 
Certainly it is difficult to equate inter-
national law and the concepts of domes-
tic law with which we are all familiar. (n 
a domestic court the law seems clear, 
and it is usually quite enough to prr-
suade the presiding ju<lge of what the 
law is. The question, ought the court to 
follow till' law, ~1'ldolll ari:::l's. If ~ound 
policy dietatl's a changl' in existing law, 
constitutional provisions arc provided to 
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seek such a change. International law, 
on the other hand, has no international 
legislature to make the rules of the game 
for all to accept and follow. It has no 
system of courts and no police force. 
Moreover, the rules of international law 
are far from being precise. There is 
often a gap between what looks legal 
and what looks reasonable. This gap is 
most often closed by asserting that what 
looks reasonable must be legal. 
A far better view would be to make 
an objective determination of what the 
rule of international law is and then 
seek to follow it. As Fisher points out: 
Rules of law must be related not 
only to the policies they are 
designed to serve, but also to the 
means by which compliance with 
the rules is to be sought. For the 
foreseeable future the basic means 
by which compliance with inter-
national law may be obtained is 
through the enlightened self-
interest of the various govern-
ments. If this is so, we must he 
prepared to argue that respect for 
international rules doet' in faet 
serve the interest of eaeh govern-
ment. The most fruitful perspec-
tive from which to discuss a ques-
tion of international law may, 
tlll!n:fon:, Ill: the one which sl!du! 
to persuade a government offieial 
of what a government ought to 
do.I7 
I nstead of taking the position that there 
is no rule of international law to deal 
with certain situations that are bound to 
arise when dealing with the prohibition 
of resort to force and nonintervention 
principles contained in the United Na-
tions Charter and the Charter of till: 
Organization of American Stall's, and 
tlll'refore the propl:r course is to pro-
('('1'(\ with whatl'VI'r pradieal aelions will 
lIIost .uh'ance till! gl'III'rill interl'sts of 
the United States, would it not be 
heLLer to ask if our Nation's interests 
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would be hetter scrved by making an 
honest and determined effort to dcvelop 
international law and live hy if? 
A pplying this concept, it iH COIl-
sidered very douhtful that interventions 
solely for the protection of property of 
nationals on foreign soil have any basis 
in the modern law. Although the Suez 
crisis of 1956 is generally regarded as 
sounding the death knell of this con-
cept, we can look to our own Govern-
ment in our own hemisphere for an-
other example. In May 1959 the 
Agrarian Reform Law in Cuba provided 
for expropriation of properties owned 
by U.S. citizens. The basis of evaluation 
was universally conceded to he unfairly 
low, and compensation was in the form 
of low interest Cuban honds redeemable 
in 20 years. Under this law, property 
was confiscated without court orders 
and in some cases without written au-
thorization. No inventories were taken 
and no receipLs given. The U.S. Govern-
ment did not question the expropriation 
law but stated that it expected compen-
sation in accordance with accepted rules 
of international law. Within 1 year, 
3900,000,000 worth of U.S. citizens' 
investments were appropriated. Cuba 
then took the position that any duty to 
compensate would impose undue hard-
ships on the Cuhan Government.18 By 
doing nothing, tlw U.S. (;oVt'rIllllcnt is 
!'Cen as abrogating any right she lIlay 
have maintained existed for interven-
tions of this type, for international law, 
as domestic law, is made through the 
actions of governments and the prece-
dents they create. 
I ntervcntions for purely humani-
tarian reasons arc also suspcct. In the 
Dominican Republic, prior to the over-
throw of Trujillo, years of flagrant and 
widespread violations of the human 
rights of Dominican citizens were ig-
nored. Following recognition of the 
r.astro I!0vrrnlllrnt in Cuba. a wave of 
political ('X('('utions siekenl'd tIll' llnill"d 
!'tat(·s. but our (;ovrrnment, in line with 
the general rule of refraining frolll 
pressing forrign goverlllnents to trcat 
their own citizens humanely, remained 
silent. When the concept of humani-
tarian intervention was rmmrn:cted ill 
A pril of ] 965 as justification for our 
initial intcrvcntion in the Dominican 
Republic, it was done to avoid reliance 
on the available legal basis of self-
defense which would have occasioned 
involvement with the United Nations. 
This is not to condemn the right of 
humanitarian intervention within the 
collective framework of the United Na-
tions or the Organization of American 
States. The latter organization is par-
ticularly unique in the stress it lays on 
the use of international law in matters 
dealing with the international concern 
for fundamental human rights,19 al-
though the already discuss(!d scnsitivity 
of Latin American States with respect 
to intervention has enhanced the diffi-
culty of devising effective international 
measures for the protection of human 
righLs. The Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights created in 1951 is 
authorized to consider individual com-
plaints of violations of certain basic 
rights, among them the right to life and 
libcrty, hut can only act in cxamining 
and reporting on conditions in the 
various states. Thus far, this Commis-
sion has proved unable to "hrcak the 
ernst of tIl!! (:ntn!ndl!!d Ihinltillg 011 
intervcntion.,,20 
In any treatment of the subjcct of 
intervcntion, mention must be made of 
the views of those who maintain .that it 
is policy and not law that determines 
the actions of states in their dealings 
with onc another. Foremost among 
these is former Secretary of State Dean 
Acheson who, in commenting on the 
legal position of thl' United States in the 
Cuban missile crisis, stated that "prin-
ciples, certainly legal principles, do not 
decide concrete cases," and that inter-
national law "simply dol'S not dral with 
. (. I' ,,2 t \1 qU('51IOn5 II II IlIlIal(' power. 1-
Ihough this position is 11115atisfal'lory as 
an appraisal of international law, it is, 
unfortunately, a realistic assessment of 
the manner in which states approach the 
conduct of international affairs. 
Self-defense, within the narrow eon-
fines of the Weltster definition with 
added emphasis on the principle of 
proportionality in measures limited to 
rrasonably repelling the danger, may, in 
the final analysis, he the only legally 
aeeeptahle grounds for intervention. To 
!'Cnd 40!) troops into the Dominiean 
Republic to eva<:uate U.S. citizens and 
other foreign nationals meets this tesl. 
To build up to 22,2B9 troops22 docs 
not. To declare, as did President.l ohn-
son in his speech of 2 I\lay 1965, in 
support of the massive involvement, 
that the United States would not toler-
ate another Communist fovernment in 
the Western Hemisphere 3 is to imply 
that thl! United SLates reserves the right 
to determine ,"Iu:ther or not there is 
sufficient Communist involvement in an 
internal revolution in the Western 
Hemisphere to be regarded as dangerous 
by the UniLed States, and, if so, the 
right to intrrvene to prevent a Commu-
nist Lakeover. This, in turn, implies 
possible intervrntion in any of the Latin 
American SLates.24 Bearing in mind 
that "Lhe shape of things to come is in 
no small way determined hy the actions 
f L ,,25 I o grea powers, was L lI're ~lI1y 
rl'ason for us Lo he shock"d by Lhe 
language of thl! "Brezhnev Doctrine" 
when Rm;sia intervened in Czechoslo-
vakia in August 19f1B'! 
"In a world huilt upon naLional 
sovereign Lies and .iurisdieLions and the 
('quality of independent states, any sLate 
that intervenes in the internal affairs of 
anoLher undermines the instiLutioml1 
and Irl!al foundations on whieh iLs own 
exi~LI'ncI~ res LS.,,2 6 {InLiI Lhere is an 
('ff('dive inLI'rnaLional orl!anizaLion Lo 
1:01'1: with IIII' nllarll"'~ of power polili"l<, 
LIlt' only hopi' for p('aI~(' and an onlt'r1y 
~()('il'l y iii'S in IIII' major I'll WI' rs ' r('aliza-
I ion IhaL n'slrainl :\1111 dl,dieal!'d :111-
Iwr('nl'l' Lo ('slahlislwt! and iIl"'('plt-d 
principles of inLernaLional law an' 
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paramount in the inLerest of survival. 
V-ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS 
That the Unit('d SLates used force Lo 
proLect iLs nationals and their property 
in the Latin American SLates in the 19th 
and early 20th centuries is a maller of 
doellmented facl. I t is also clear that 
whaLever the posture of the United 
SLaLes prior Lo World War II, iLs legal 
obligalions havl: sinee ehanged consider-
ably, particularly in view of its partici-
pation in the United Nations and Lhe 
Organization of A merican States. While 
a commanding officer may have acted 
with impunity in the early 20th eentury 
with regard to protecting U.S. citizens 
on foreign soil, such is not the case 
today. The fact remains, however, that 
although customary international law 
has changed and treaty obligations 
imposl! restrain t, the prohlem of pro-
tecting nationals can hardly be termed 
ohsolete. That the United States must 
protect its citizens when a local govern-
ment is unahle or unwilling to protect 
them is as true today as it was in 1928 
whclI Secretary II ughes addre5sed this 
prohlem to the Sixth Conference of 
Inter-A merit'an States. 
Recognizing that prevention is the 
only real remedy and that a state still 
has a duty, if not a right, to protect its 
citizens, how then is this protection to 
he afforded? 1£ action is taken uni-
laterally, a plea of safety of nationals or 
even humanitarian intervention may, 
unfortunately, he a pretext for interven-
tion having nationalistic or other ul-
terior aims. While most of the examples 
of use of force cited by Offutt were 
confined to the purpose avowed-the 
protection of nationals-many possessed 
unavoidable political significance. Such 
significance would he inescapable today. 
Certainly there is no country in Latin 
America in which we do not have strong 
political and economic interest. 
Inter-American collective interven-
tion through the auspices of the 
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Org~nization of American States would 
solve many of the problems inherent in 
unilateral action. 1 A permanen t r n ter· 
American Peace Force would provide a 
partial an~wer to the prac:tical problem 
of devising a system capable of swift 
action in future emergencies similar to 
the Dominican Republic crisis of 1965. 
The United States favors the creation of 
such a force, and at the Second Inter-
American Conference at Rio de Janeiro 
in November 1965 tried to interest the 
Latin American nations in just thal. 2 
~Iost Latin A merican States opposed 
the idea. Their view was forcefully 
stated in, Chilean Foreign l\linister 
Gabriel Valdes' specch, when he said: 
"The inter-American force would give 
our regional system a negative and 
dangerous ideological connotation, it 
would destroy the fundamental prin-
ciple of non-intervention and would 
threaten to divide us into irreconcilable 
blocs.,,3 Profes~or Plank suggests that 
Latin AmeriealH; would eon~id('r that 
any sUl'h force would he colledive in 
name only; that the dominant position 
of the United States would mean that 
any intl:rvention would have to he 
aeccptahle to and dominatcd hy it.4 At 
any ratc, the (I.S. intervention in the 
Dominiean Repuhlic will leave lasting 
scars, and it is doubtful that such a 
forcc will ever he created. 
Thus politically undesirable as it may 
be, unilateral intervention would appear 
to be the only answer. As discussed 
supra, to be lawful such intervention 
would have to be cncompasscd within 
the concept of self-dcfense. I t would 
have to meet the test of necessity, and, 
above all, it would have to lIl~et the 
standard of proportionality. As pointed 
out by Professor Alford, "military 
action taken to acquire territory, super-
sede a government, obtain special con-
cessions or to secure various political 
advantages, seems easily distinguishable 
from limited action to protect ... citi-
zenS which is terminated when the 
persons are withdrawn or are otherwise 
secured. "S 
In today's politically oriented world, 
any decision to intervene under the 
principle of self-defense for the protec-
tion of the liVl's of U.S. ('itiz('ns ~houlcl, 
ideally, be made at Llw high('st (;overn-
ment level, leaving to tin: naval COIII-
mander only the task of implementing 
this decision. Howevcr, since, in the 
final analysis, pn:vcn tion is thl' ollly 
remedy and timeliness is csscntial to 
prevention, it is not difficult to envision 
a situation where, despite modern com-
munication techniques, the com-
manding officer must be prepared to 
determine the best Course of action 
under the circumstances and then imple-
ment his own decision. 
A uthority for such a deeh;ioll exists, 
as it has since 189:~, in artieies 061:~ ancl 
061,t of U.S. Navy Regulations. It re-
mains only to update article 0614 to 
conform to Illodrrn standards of cus-
tOlllary inL<'rnati()lwl law. I t is sll~~m;t(,cl 
that this ('an III' m'('()Il1l'lislH'd hy the 
simple expediency of deleting any refer-
ence to "property" and substituting the 
words "sel f-dl'f rma!" for the outmoded 
language "sel f-preservation" wherever 
the latter appears. Additionally, bearing 
in mind the serious intrrJ)ational cOllse-
quenees that an application of force 
could entail, it is suggested that specific 
operation ordl'rs III' written with a view 
toward giving commanding officcrs 
definitive gliidalll'(~ in the enfor('rlllenL 
of this right, rlllpha~izillg thc concept of 
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